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INTRODUCTION

The timing of Professor Michael Klarman's The Framers'
Coup is fortuitous. Under a never-used constitutional provision,'
twenty-eight states have asked for a convention to write a balanced budget amendment.2 Should six more states ask for a convention, presumably Congress will call one. Such a convention
could lead to a simple amendment on this issue. But it could also
lead to a full-blown attempt to rewrite the Constitution.
Klarman's book is an important contribution to this conversation.
While I disagree with some of Klarman's arguments, if we have a
new constitutional convention, this book-along with Professor
Richard Beeman's elegant Plain, Honest Men3--ought to be required reading for every delegate.
Klarman's mammoth book is reminiscent of Professor
Charles Beard's An Economic Interpretationof the Constitution of
the United States.4 Like Beard, Klarman has a conspiratorial
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Fulbright Chair in Human Rights and Social Justice, University of Ottawa, Ottawa,
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1
See US Const Art V.
2

See Michael Leachman and David A. Super, States Likely Could Not Control Con-

stitutionalConvention on Balanced Budget Amendment or Other Issues (Center on Budget
and Policy Priorities, Jan 18, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/3XWW-N7CC (arguing
that "[a] convention held today could set its own agenda" with "no guarantee that a convention could be limited to a particular set of issues').
3 See generally Richard Beeman, Plain, Honest Men: The Making of the American
Constitution (Random House 2009).
4
See generally Charles A. Beard, An Economic Interpretationof the Constitution of
the United States (Macmillan 1913).
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tone. His title-The Framers'Coup-implies that James Madison
and company stole liberty and self-government from the
American people. Beard sought to discredit the Constitution (and
by implication, Supreme Court decisions) during the Lochner era.
Like Beard, Klarman argues that the Framers ignored populist
sentiments and that ratification was the result of "calculations of
material interest" (p 615). Beard's Framers were motivated by
narrow economic self-interest, while Klarman sees the
Convention as a coup and ratification as a result of "interestbased thinking" (p 615).
This Review challenges Klarman's argument that the
Philadelphia Convention was essentially an antidemocratic coup
that produced a document that ran counter to the wishes of the
American people. Klarman and I agree the Constitution of 1787
was deeply flawed. However, unlike Klarman, I argue many of
these flaws stem from the nationalists' inability to overcome populist opposition to democratic values, and thus the Constitution's
flaws result from the very populism that Klarman embraces. Rather than a coup, I argue that the Constitution was an incomplete
and imperfect revolutionary transformation that gave most voters the political, economic, and diplomatic stability they wanted
and the military security they needed.
I. THE HERITAGE OF 1787 AND THE "IMBECILITY OF THE
CONFEDERATION"

Opponents of a new convention (and I am firmly in that camp)
fear that such a gathering might try to undermine privacy, civil
rights, civil liberties, and other fundamental rights, instead of
just writing a balanced budget amendment.5 As Chief Justice
Warren Burger observed:
[T]here is no effective way to limit or muzzle the actions of a
Constitutional Convention. The Convention could make its
own rules and set its own agenda. Congress might try to limit
the Convention to one amendment or to one issue, but there
is no way to assure that the Convention would obey. After a
Convention is convened, it will be too late to stop the
Convention if we don't like its agenda.6
See, for example, Leachman and Super, States Likely Could Not Control Constitu5
tional Convention (cited in note 2).
Letter from Chief Justice Warren Burger to Phyllis Schlafly (June 22, 1988), ar6
chived at http://perma.cc/97BB-QGGW.
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Justice Antonin Scalia succinctly noted: "I certainly would not
want a constitutional convention. Whoa! Who knows what would
come out of it?"7

If delegates to a modern convention strayed beyond a balanced budget amendment, they would violate their mandate.
That would be a runaway convention. But was the Philadelphia
gathering a runaway convention? Congress gave the Convention
an open-ended mandate for "revising the Articles of
Confederation" with "such alterations and provisions" necessary
to "render the federal constitution adequate to the exigencies of
Government & the preservation of the Union."8
Professor Klarman argues that the Convention exceeded this
mandate in an undemocratic coup that imposed "a system of government very different from the one that most Americans would
have expected or desired" (p 616). But the Convention certainly
complied with the mandate of "revising the Articles of
Confederation."9 As Governor Edmund Randolph explained to the
Convention, the fatally unwieldly and dysfunctional Articles led
to "the difficulty of the crisis, and the necessity of preventing the
fulfilment of the prophecies of the American downfal[l]."io
Randolph detailed the "[i]mbecility of the Confederation,"" later
arguing that "[w]hen the salvation of the Republic was at stake,
it would be treason to our trust, not to propose what we found
necessary" (p 143). He stressed "the imbecility of the existing confederacy and the danger of delaying a substantial reform."12 This
"imbecility" made it impossible for the national government to adjudicate disputes between the states, collect taxes, evict British
troops from American soil, suppress domestic disturbances, negotiate foreign trade agreements (pp 11-12), or secure American access to the port of New Orleans (pp 48-69).
As Klarman demonstrates, "By 1787, most politically prominent Americans agreed that the Articles of Confederation were
flawed and in need of amendment" (p 69) while "[n]ewspapers
were filled with calls for a more powerful federal government"
(p 69). Most Americans hungered for change. They may not have
7
Marcia Coyle, Scalia, Ginsburg Offer Amendments to the Constitution(Law.com, Apr
17,
2014),
online
at
http://www.law.com/sites/articles/2014/04/17/scalia-ginsburg
-offer-amendments-to-the-constitution/ (visited Aug 26, 2017) (Perma archive unavailable).
8 Max Farrand, ed, 3 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 14 (Yale 1911).
9
Id at 14.
10 Id at 18.
11 Id at 25.
12 Farrand, ed, 3 Records of the Federal Convention at 14 (cited
in note 8).
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expected a wholesale revamping of the Articles, but the "imbecility" of the Articles illustrates why the Convention accepted the
arguments of nationalists like James Madison, James Wilson,
and Gouverneur Morris-all supported by George Washingtonthat radical change was needed. That most Americans accepted
this change undermines the claim that this was a coup by a runaway convention.
Klarman's strongest argument for a coup comes from the
Framers' end run around the process for amending the Articles.
The Articles required that amendments be unanimously approved by the states. 13 Instead of legislative ratification, the
Convention provided for special elections to choose delegates to
state ratification conventions.14 Jettisoning the unanimity requirement, the Framers provided that the Constitution would be
in force when nine state conventions had ratified it. 15This revolutionary provision violated the Articles, but if it constituted a coup,
it was a popular coup: in the end, Congress and all thirteen states
peacefully accepted the process.
This deviation from the amendment process reflected the
practical reality that the unanimity requirement made it impossible to change the Articles. Klarman demonstrates the enormous
nationwide support for change, but Rhode Island's refusal to send
delegates to Philadelphia underscored the impossibility of achieving unanimity. As Madison rhetorically asked Patrick Henry at
the Virginia ratifying convention: "Would the honorable gentleman agree to continue the most radical defects in the old system,
because the petty state of Rhode Island would not agree to remove
them?" (p 611). Similarly, in July, two of New York's three delegates returned home, denouncing the Convention in a public letter to Governor George Clinton (p 253). If the Convention had left
ratification in the hands of the state legislatures, Rhode Island
and New York would have raced to see which state could sink the
Constitution first.
In 1787, many leaders feared that, without reform, the nation
would devolve into anarchy or tyranny (p 316). One member of
Congress noted, "The period seems to be fast approaching when
the people" of the nation "must determine to establish a permanent capable government or submit to the horrors of anarchy and
licentiousness" (p 316). Similarly, Randolph warned the

14

Articles of Confederation Art XIII.
US Const Art VII.

15

Id.

13
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Convention "of anarchy from the laxity of government every
where."16 Most Americans believed that anarchy and lawlessness
would inevitably lead to tyranny.1 7 Without a new constitution,
the experiment in "government of the people" would have "perish[ed."18 Thus, the Convention offered a radical but practical alternative to the existing amendment process. After ten months of
intense debate, the country accepted the offer. Had Congress or
the states seen this as a coup, they could have easily stopped the
Constitution. They did not.
II. PROBLEMS WITH THE CONSTITUTION

The Framers created a deeply flawed and, in many ways, undemocratic system. These defects reflect compromise, stubborn
demands for special treatment by some states, and strategic
moves to help secure ratification. Professor Klarman argues that
the Framers pulled off an undemocratic, antipopulist coup. However, many of the most undemocratic elements of the Constitution
resulted from populist demands that nationalists like Madison
grudgingly accepted although they were antithetical to the essence of representative government.
The populists at the Convention saddled the nation with the
deeply unrepresentative Senate, which equalizes state representation irrespective of the states' respective populations. In our
own time this has led to the "imbecility" that the 568,000 people
in Wyoming get two senators while the 37,000,000 people in
California also get only two.1 9 The imbecility of the Senate that
denies fair political representation to the majority of Americans
is compounded by Article V, which provides that "no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the
Senate."20 In 1962, the Supreme Court recognized the deeply antidemocratic nature of such a system:

16

Max Farrand, ed, 1 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 19 (Yale 1911).

See generally Paul Finkelman, Between Scylla and Charybdis:Anarchy, Tyranny
and the Debate over a Bill of Rights, in Ronald Hoffman and Peter J. Albert, eds, The Bill
17

of Rights: Government Proscribed 103 (Virginia 1997).
18 Abraham
Lincoln, Gettysburg Address (Nov 19, 1863), archived at
http://perma.cc/K8LF-8N78.
19 Kristin D. Burnett, CongressionalApportionment: 2010 Census Briefs *2 (US Census Bureau, Nov 2011), archived at http://perma.cc/U59X-B5PN (Table 1). For a more elaborate discussion of this issue, see Paul Finkelman, Who Counted, Who Voted, and Who
Could They Vote For, 58 SLU L J 1071, 1081-82 (2014).
20 US Const Art V.
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[I]f a State should provide that the votes of citizens in one
part of the State should be given two times, or five times, or
10 times the weight of votes of citizens in another part of the
State, it could hardly be contended that the right to vote of
those residing in the disfavored areas had not been effectively
diluted.21

The Court ended such systems for state legislatures and congressional districts22-but not for the Senate.
This undemocratic outcome was not a nationalist coup. It resulted from the nationalists' failure to completely undo the imbecility of state equality under the Articles. This antidemocratic
provision resulted from persistent demands of delegates from
small states-Klarman's populists. Madison argued political
power should be "immediately derived from the people, in proportion to their numbers"23 while Wilson argued that "equal numbers
of people ought to have an equal no. of representatives."24 The
originators of Klarman's Federalist coup articulated the concept
of "one person, one vote" about 175 years ahead of the Supreme
Court. A more successful coup by the Founders would have eliminated state equality in the Senate.
Similarly, the Convention left us with the Electoral College,
setting the stage for candidates winning the most votes yet losing
the election at least five times, and maybe six25--about one out of
every seven elected presidents. By basing a state's electoral votes
on its full congressional delegation, the Electoral College dramatically favors smaller states because of the rule that each state gets
two senators no matter how small the state is. This was a victory
for the small-state populists at the expense of the more populous
states, and continues to give disproportionate and undemocratic
power to the small states.

Reynolds v Sims, 377 US 533, 562 (1964).
See generally Baker v Carr, 369 US 186 (1962); Wesberry v Sanders, 376 US 1 (1964).
23 Farrand, ed, 1 Records of the Federal Convention at 472 (cited in note 16).
24 Id at 179.
25 Andrew Jackson (1824), Samuel J. Tilden (1876), Grover Cleveland (1888), Al Gore
(2000), and Hillary Clinton (2016) won the popular vote but lost the election. In addition,
it is likely that John Adams won the popular vote in 1800, but we have no records of that
vote. Thomas Jefferson won the election in 1800 because of electoral votes created by
counting slaves for purposes of representation. If we take the presidential electors from
Jefferson created by counting slaves, and do the same for Adams, then Adams wins the
election. See Paul Finkelman, The Proslavery Origins of the Electoral College, 23 Cardozo
L Rev 1145, 1145-46 & nn 1-5 (2002).
21
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The origin of the Electoral College is particularly perverse.
Nationalists at the Convention favored a direct election of the
president. Madison believed that "the people at large" were "the
fittest" to choose the president.26 But Madison rejected this concept mostly because the slave states "could have no influence in
the election on the score of the Negroes."27 Thus, the Electoral
College folded the political power of the three-fifths clause into
the election of the president.
The Constitution also protected slavery by making it impossible to end human bondage through any normal political process, 28 giving southerners extra representation in Congress because of their slaves, promising that the national government
would suppress slave rebellions, protecting the right to import
new African slaves for at least twenty years, and allowing slave
owners to hunt down fugitive slaves in free states (pp 257-304).29
After the Convention, General Charles Cotesworth Pinckney
bragged to the South Carolina legislature, "In short, considering
all circumstances, we have made the best terms for the security
of this species of property it was in our power to make."30 This is

one area in which Klarman's coup theory makes sense. The slave
owners were the great winners in 1787. Through bluster, bluffs,
and threats, they won almost everything they demanded.
III. WAS THE CONVENTION A COUP?
The central question raised by the book is Professor
Klarman's complicated argument that the Convention accomplished a coup by creating a document that was antidemocratic,
antipopulist, and against the wishes of the American people. Yet
Klarman never defines what he means by a coup. The common
understanding is that a coup is accomplished by force or threat of
force, as a minority illegally seizes power from the majority or the
government in power. Did the Convention accomplish a coup-as
Klarman claims-in any meaningful sense?
Nor does Klarman define what he means by "populist,"
although he seems to imply that the populists were the "good

26

Max Farrand, ed, 2 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 56 (Yale 1911).

27

Id at

57.

See Paul Finkelman, Slavery and the Founders: Race and Liberty in the Age of
Jefferson 6-8 (Routledge 2d ed 2014).
29 See US Const Art I, § 9, cl 1; US Const Art IV, § 2, cl 3.
30 Jonathan Elliot, 4 The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption
of the Federal Constitution286 (Burt Franklin 2d ed 1966).
28
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guys" and the Federalists were the "bad guys" who imposed a
Constitution against the wishes of the majority (p 609). Throughout the book, he characterizes the Federalists as "antidemocratic"
and, by default, their opponents-the populists and
Antifederalists-were "democratic" (pp 244-46). But he never
confronts the possibility that his populists and Antifederalists
were often antidemocratic. For example, Rhode Island, the least
democratic state in the nation, with the most restricted suffrage,31
was also the most Antifederalist. On the other hand, strongly
Federalist Pennsylvania had the nation's most democratic state
constitution, expansive suffrage that included free blacks, and a
"political culture . . . that was the most democratic and fractious
of any in America."32

The creation of the Senate illustrates this tension. James
Madison and other nationalists wanted Senate seats based on
population. This was the most "democratic" way to create a new
government and reflect the principle, set out in the Declaration of
Independence, that governments derived "their just powers from
the consent of the governed,"3s which required that representation
be based on the governed-in other words, the population. The
Senate resembled the rotten boroughs of Great Britain, which so
infuriated Revolutionary-era Americans. That tiny Delaware or
Rhode Island would have the same vote in the Senate as Virginia
or Pennsylvania was a throwback to the state equality in
Congress under the Articles that the leading Framers wanted to
discard. Thus, Governor Randolph argued that representation in
the new legislature should be based on population, and "Madison
moved . . . the following resolution-'that the equality of suffrage
established by the articles of Confederation ought not to prevail
in the national Legislature, and that an equitable ratio of representation ought to be substituted."'34
But the populists at the Convention insisted on state equality
in the Senate, leading, as I already noted, to a system of representation that gives voters in small states far more political power
31 Beeman, Plain, Honest Men at 29 (cited in note 3). See also William M. Wiecek,
The Guarantee Clause of the U.S. Constitution 86-88 (Cornell 1972) (noting that Rhode
Island's government was established by its charter in 1663, that suffrage under the charter was limited to male property owners and their oldest sons, and that the allocation of
seats in the legislature had not been changed since 1663).
32 Beeman, Plain, Honest Men at 39 (cited in note 3). See also id at 132 (noting that
the Pennsylvania state constitution was "more radically democratic than any in America").
33 US Declaration of Independence ¶ 2 (1776).
34 Farrand, ed, 1 Records of the Federal Convention at 36 (cited in note 16).
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than those in large states, which can skew presidential elections
(through the Electoral College). The Senate, rooted in populism,
was a rejection of the federalist goal of getting rid of state equality. This antidemocratic institution is an example of how the
Framers' "coup" failed.
The chronology of the adoption of the Constitution also undermines the coup argument. Congress, composed of representatives chosen by state legislatures, called for the Convention in
early 1787. The state legislatures then chose delegates. This process was not directly democratic, but it was consistent with how
delegates to all national gatherings had been chosen since before
the Revolution.
Klarman argues that the coup began with this process and
claims that allowing the state legislatures to choose the delegates
"probably ensured that nationalist and antipopulist views would
be overrepresented" (p 246). But why should this be so? Kiarman
correctly explains that most state legislatures were reasonably
democratic. Legislators served short terms, came from small districts, and were thus close to the people. Why would these populist state legislatures have sent nationalists to Philadelphia unless they understood the need for a new government?
Klarman notes that the "[s]tate legislatures were apt to
choose prominent citizens to represent their states at a national
convention" (p 246) and that these "prominent citizens" were
more likely to be nationalists (p 246). This double claim is problematic. Who else should the legislatures have chosen? Unknown
random citizens? Colonial and state legislatures had been choosing "prominent" men for national service since the Stamp Act
Congress in 1765. But this does not mean they had to be nationalists or antipopulists. Virginia chose committed antinationalists,
Patrick Henry (p 250) and George Mason (pp 203-04), as well as
nationalists, Madison and George Washington. New York chose
two antinationalists, John Lansing (p 253) and Robert Yates
(p 253), and one nationalist, Alexander Hamilton.
Klarman complains that thirty of the delegates were
Revolutionary War veterans (p 246), implying that these former
officers helped engineer the coup. But who else should have been
chosen? In the eighteenth century, military service was a key
component of citizenship and a civic duty that almost all adult
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men willingly and often enthusiastically accepted.15 Should the
legislatures have chosen former Tories or "shirkers" who did not
fight for Independence? Wartime military service has always
been a stepping stone to a political career. For example, from 1869
to 1900, every elected president but Grover Cleveland was a Civil
War officer and every president from 1952 to 1993 was an officer
in World War II, except Jimmy Carter, who had been too young.
Similarly, most of the delegates at the Convention had served in
the Patriot army or the Revolutionary government.
It is also hard to imagine that, if the delegates had been directly elected, the outcome would have been different. If Generals
Washington, Pinckney, John Dickinson, Thomas Mifflin, or
Colonel Hamilton, or Captain Nicholas Gilman had run for a position at the Convention, the voters in Virginia, South Carolina,
Delaware, Pennsylvania, New York, or New Hampshire would
probably have elected them. Virtually all the delegates were experienced wartime patriots and seasoned politicians whom average voters believed in, trusted, and admired. But not all were
nationalists.
Klarman correctly notes that the "nationalist and antipopulist bent of the convention was a function [also] . . . of who chose
not to participate" (p 248). Rhode Island simply refused to send
delegates while the antinationalist Henry declined his appointment (pp 248-50). Professor Beeman dramatically says that if
Henry had known about Madison's plans, "he would have
mounted his horse, ridden to Philadelphia, and voiced his vehement opposition."36 While Henry declined his appointment well
before the Convention met, he knew that Madison and
Washington hated the Articles. Surely Henry knew the views of
the extreme nationalist, Hamilton of New York. Given who was
pushing for a convention, only a politician with his head in the
sand would not have known that nationalism was in the air, and
men like Madison, Hamilton, and James Wilson were ready to
create a stronger national government. Henry's failure to show up
may be America's first example of the aphorism, "if you snooze,
you lose." But you can hardly claim that those who were awake
conspired to pull off a coup because Henry, or the entire state of
Rhode Island, chose to snooze.

35 See Akhil Reed Amar, America's Constitution: A Biography 323-27 (Random
House 2005).
36 Beeman, Plain, Honest Men at 92 (cited in note 3).
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Normally, we think of a coup as an illegal takeover of the government through violence. Even the term "bloodless coup" suggests a threat of violence. But in September 1787, there was no
threat of violence. No Brown Shirts threatened Congress; no army
surrounded Federal Hall. It was all peaceful and calm. Some
coup!
If the Congress believed this was a coup, it could have rejected the Constitution, ruled that ratification had to be unanimous, or amended the document. Rejecting such options,
demonstrating there was no coup, Congress directed the state legislatures to call for democratically elected ratification conventions. The state legislatures had good reasons to block the
Constitution, which would make them subordinate to the national
government under the Supremacy Clause.37 If this was the
"Founders' Coup"-abolishing the existing Congress, centralizing
all this power, undermining state power, and compelling state officials to place the national constitution above their own-then it
was accomplished with shocking ease and the complicity of
Congress and most state legislatures.
The states dutifully accepted the revolutionary ratification
process. Surely such a revolution or coup should have required
troops in the street and cannons aimed at statehouses. But none
of that happened. Except for Rhode Island, every state complied
with Congress's request and held conventions within ten
months. This is powerful evidence that the process was not a
coup, but rather a peaceful transition to escape the imbecility of
the Articles.
During the Revolution, the states had often refused to comply
with congressional requisitions of money and troops, and "the continental government struggled to persuade the individual state
governments to match their words with their deeds."38 By 1777,
national officials "were reduced to begging the states to contribute
their fair share to the war effort."3e After the war, many states
refused to comply with the peace treaty with England.40 Time and
again, the states notoriously ignored Congress, which is why
Congress was bankrupt in 1787.

37 US Const Art VI, cl 2.
Beeman, Plain, Honest Men at 8-9 (cited in note 3).
39 Id at 9.
40 In Virginia, some of these issues would not be resolved until the Supreme Court
decided Martin v Hunter's Lessee, 14 US (1 Wheat) 304 (1816).
38
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The Framers offered the nation one last chance to avoid anarchy, tyranny, or the dissolution of the nation into a number of
small countries that would have been vulnerable to Great Britain,
France, or Spain. The nation accepted the offer, and the states
deferred to Congress on the ratification process. By early
January, five states had ratified, and on June 25, Virginia gave
the Constitution its tenth ratification.41 A month later, New York
became the eleventh pillar of the federal edifice.42 Congress immediately accepted the work of the Framers, which was ratified
after democratic elections in eleven jurisdictions43 following extensive, robust, and open debate. There has never been a coup like
that.
Was the Philadelphia gathering a "runaway" convention, exceeding the purpose for which it was called? That call itself was
ambiguous. Congress instructed the states to choose delegates
"for the sole and express purpose of revising the Articles of
Confederation and reporting" their work to Congress and the
states in order to "render the federal constitution adequate to the
exigencies of Government & the preservation of the Union."44 The
Framers took this language and applied it to a robust
Convention that did what was necessary for "the preservation of
the Union." After that, they sent it to the states for debate in
separate conventions.
Klarman argues that the "lack of transparency in the process
leading to the drafting of the Constitution" led to the Federalist
coup (p 616). He claims "some people who might have resisted the
dominant tendencies of the convention chose not to participate"
because of "the lack of transparency in the convention's
agenda" (p 249).
The problem here is that people like Henry declined their appointment well before the Convention met, before anyone knew
what was going to happen, before there was anything to be transparent about. It was not lack of transparency that kept Henry

41 See Gordon Lloyd, State-by-State Ratification Table (Ashbrook, 2017), archived at
http://perma.cc/T7AQ-D6SG.
42
See Linda Grant DePauw, The Eleventh Pillar:New York State and the Federal
Constitution 44 (Cornell 1966).
43 Rhode Island boycotted the ratification process until after the Constitution had
gone into effect. The North Carolina convention adjourned without a vote, reassembling
and ratifying in November 1789. Rhode Island finally ratified in May 1790. See Lloyd,
State-by-State RatificationTable (cited in note 41).
44 Farrand, ed, 3 Records of the Federal Convention at 14 (cited in note 8) (describing
the February 21, 1787, resolution of Congress).
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in Virginia, but his lack of interest45 (p 250) and his desire to
return to his law practice "to earn some money."4e Had Henry
predicted what the Convention was going to do, he might have
attended, but his failure to attend cannot be explained by a lack
of transparency.
Before the Convention met, there was no "agenda." Some delegates-Madison, Hamilton, Wilson-were openly nationalist,
and everyone would have been aware of their goals. But other delegates had different agendas. The Delaware delegates arrived
sworn to insist on state equality in the national legislature and
threatened to withdraw from the Convention over the issue.47
South Carolina's delegates favored a stronger national government but only if it protected slavery.
What would "transparency" have looked like before the
Convention? The men pushing for a convention notoriously favored a stronger national government. The proto-Antifederalists
in New York shrewdly sent two antinationalists to outvote the
nationalist Hamilton. Virginia chose the antinationalists Henry
and Mason to counter Madison and Washington. But Henry refused to serve and the two New York antinationalists left the
Convention early, after they were fully apprised of the nationalists' goals (pp 248-50). This was not a transparency issue-it was
the failure of the antinationalists to engage in the debate.
Any presumed lack of transparency does not explain why
Antifederalists abandoned the Convention. If John Lansing and
Robert Yates, "two of the most implacable opponents of a
strengthened government,"48 had remained in Philadelphia, New
York would have voted against the document and the signing
statement could not have claimed the Constitution was approved
by the "Unanimous Consent of the States present."49 If James
McClurg had remained, he probably would have joined Randolph
and Mason in not signing, and Virginia's delegation would have
been equally divided. Had Henry attended, the state would have
voted "no" at the Convention. Had Luther Martin and John F.

45

See Beeman, Plain, Honest Men at 92 (cited in note 3).

46

John A. Ragosta, PatrickHenry: Proclaiminga Revolution 85 (Routledge 2017).

Farrand, ed, 1 Records of the Federal Convention at 4 (cited in note 16) ("On reading the Credentials of the deputies it was noticed that those from Delaware were prohibited from changing the Article in the Confederation establishing an equality of votes
among the States."). See also id at 6, 37 (noting that delegates threatened to leave the
Convention).
47

48

49

Beeman, Plain, Honest Men at 203 (cited in note 3).
US Const Art VII, cl 2.
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Mercer remained (p 254), they would have significantly increased
the "non-signers" at the end of the Convention. These
Antifederalists could have collectively issued a powerful dissenting statement, or they might have forced the Convention to
change the document. That these Antifederalists abandoned their
posts, or never showed up, has nothing to do with Federalist practices, an alleged coup, or a lack of transparency.
Klarman also complains about the ratification process, arguing that:
[W]hat most Federalists wanted was not a genuine national
debate on the merits of the Constitution but simply its ratification. During the ratifying contest, they generally sought to
preempt the debate, recognizing that the longer the process
lasted and the more people learned about the Constitution,
the worse were their chances of winning (p 618).
This argument does not comport with the realities of politics
or with what the Federalists actually did. To say that the Framers
wanted "simply its ratification" hardly seems surprising. They
wrote the Constitution to save the nation from anarchy, not to
create some grand debating society. However, there was in fact
voluminous debate across the country. The FederalistPapersare
only the best known of the massive amount of Federalist constitutional analysis. There were equally important Antifederalist
publications.50
Klarman is correct that the Federalists pushed for speedy
ratification, but they did not avoid debate. State conventions were
elected after robust debates. Federalists everywhere engaged in
open and enthusiastic debate to choose ratification delegates, often winning resounding victories. In other states, such as Virginia
and Massachusetts, elections were quite close, and in New York
the Federalists were swamped at the polls.
In the states where Federalists won decisive victories, there
was less debate in the conventions; lengthy debate was unnecessary or actually impossible because all the delegates supported
ratification. But, even where Federalists had unstoppable majorities, there was debate. It is not clear how much more debate
Klarman thinks there should have been or where it should have
been held. Politics and elections are not like moot court arguments. The Federalists wanted to see the Constitution ratified.
5) See generally Merrill Jensen, ed, 2 The Documentary History of the Ratificationof
the Constitution (Historical Society of Wisconsin 1976).
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Three of the first five state conventions ratified unanimously, so
the debates were short. There was no one on the other side of the
issue to carry on a debate. There was no reason for Federalists in
the Delaware, Georgia, or New Jersey conventions to play devil's
advocate or have a moot debate just for the sake of talking.
Federalists
completely
controlled
Pennsylvania's
Convention. Nevertheless, they held more than three weeks of
spirited debate before voting two-to-one to ratify.51 In
Connecticut, the Federalists had a three-to-one majority, and the
debates lasted only six days.52 Perhaps this is what Klarman has
in mind when he argues that the Federalists suppressed the debate (p 618). But six days was enough to consider the document
when three-quarters of the delegates wanted to ratify. The votes
were so lopsided in these first five conventions because the voters
in these states overwhelmingly favored the Constitution.
In Pennsylvania, Antifederalists-not Federalists-opposed
debate. After the Convention ended, the Pennsylvania legislature
moved to call for a ratification convention (p 427). The
Pennsylvania constitution required two-thirds of the legislature
for a quorum, rather than a simple majority. To prevent the legislature from calling a convention, nineteen Antifederalists boycotted the legislature to prevent a quorum. A Philadelphia mob
forced two legislators to return to the legislature. Antifederalists
properly denounced the mob action. However, the legislature's
sergeant at arms would have arrested the boycotters if the mob
had not done so. Meanwhile, Federalists denounced the "barefaced act of tyranny and wickedness" of those elected officials who
neglected their duty by boycotting the legislature (p 427). Both
sides had a point. But the boycott shows it was Antifederalists,
not Federalists, who opposed debate.
In other states, the Federalists won precisely because of
lengthy debates. Federalists in the Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, and Virginia conventions initially lacked a majority.53
A quick vote might have defeated the Constitution in those states.
But, after weeks of debate in Massachusetts and Virginia, votes
shifted, and the Federalists won. In New Hampshire, the debates
51 The vote in the Pennsylvania ratifying convention was forty-six in favor of the
Constitution and twenty-three against. See Beeman, Plain, Honest Men at 382 (cited in
note 3).
52 See id at 384-85.
53 See id at 387, 391, 395-400. Beeman notes that "the Massachusetts ratifying convention would offer the opponents of the Constitution a greater opportunity to voice their
misgivings than ... the conventions that had preceded it." Id at 387.
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54
were shorter, but the result was the same. Federalists carried
the day in these debates. In Virginia, Madison and his allies eviscerated the antinationalist proto-states' rights arguments of
Henry and other Antifederalists. In Rhode Island, the
Antifederalist legislature refused to call a convention at all, thus
refusing to engage in debate.
Antifederalists adopted what might be called the "ostrich
strategy"-ignoring the process, hoping it would go away. It took
nine states to ratify the Constitution but only five to derail it.
Antifederalists controlled New York,55 North Carolina,56 Rhode
Island,57 and Virginia, where they "were more formidable than
those anywhere in America."58 In Massachusetts, the outcome
was "too close to call" when the state's ratification convention began.59 Instead of -calling conventions and defeating the
Constitution, the Antifederalists did nothing and, contrary to
Klarman, refused to engage in politics or debate. Meanwhile,
Federalists in Delaware, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Georgia, and
Connecticut quickly ratified either unanimously or by impressive
majorities.60 If the Constitution was as unpopular as Klarman
claims-if it was a coup by a runaway convention-why weren't
the opponents willing to call ratifying conventions to defeat it?
Klarman argues that the Federalists had "built-in advantages" in the ratification process (p 610) because opponents
were in the backwoods and harder to organize and most of the
newspapers were Federalist (p 610). But this cannot explain the
Antifederalists' failure to act in Rhode Island, New York,
Virginia, New Hampshire, or North Carolina, where they were
enormously powerful. Klarman says the Virginia and New York
Antifederalists "made a serious tactical blunder by scheduling
their states' ratifying conventions so late in the process that they
became mostly irrelevant to the larger outcome" (p 610). But
Antifederalist incompetence does not make Federalist success a
coup. The Antifederalists' "tactical blunder" resulted from their
political ideology and their refusal to engage in debate. In the end,
the lethargy of the Antifederalists reflected their ideology and
their lack of energy.

54 See id at 391.
55 DePauw, The Eleventh Pillarat 57 (cited in note 42).
Beeman, Plain, Honest Men at 403-05 (cited in note 3).
Id at 391-92.
58 Id at 395.
59 Id at 386.
60 See Lloyd, State-by-State Ratification Table (cited in note 41).
56
57
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By contrast, the Federalists had "energy"-one of Publius's
favorite words. In The FederalistPapers,Hamilton argued the nation needed "[a]n enlightened zeal for the energy and efficiency of
government,"61 while the government under the Articles was "destitute of energy."62 The Federalists had energy; the Antifederalists
had none. Klarman complains about Federalist tactics, the fact
that most newspapers supported them, that they were politically
aggressive. But Klarman ultimately admits:
Despite all their advantages and shrewd tactical decisions,
Federalists probably could not have won the battle over ratification had a great many Americans not agreed with
Randolph's assessment that the Articles of Confederation
had "proved totally inadequate to the purpose for which it
was devised" and had become a "political farce" that needed
to be drastically revised or replaced (p 611).
Thus, in eleven states, the people elected conventions that ratified
the Constitution because it was the only viable alternative to the
"imbecility" of the Articles. This was not a coup; it was a popular
revolution in government with enormous electoral support.
Klarman claims that the ratification process "depart[ed] from
existing norms-especially in New England-of how important
governance decisions were to be made" (p 618). He explains how
town meetings voted on the Massachusetts constitution of 1780
(p 618).63 But he fails to acknowledge that Massachusetts was the
only state to send its Revolutionary-era constitution to the people
for their consideration. In each of the other ten states 64 that
adopted constitutions during that time period, the legislature
simply wrote and promulgated the constitution.
Here, Klarman has it completely backwards. With the exception of Massachusetts, the Federalists proposed the most democraticprocess ever used in the new nation to ratify a constitution.
Federalist 1 (Hamilton), in The Federalist3, 5 (Wesleyan 1961) (Jacob E. Cooke, ed).
Federalist 15 (Hamilton), in The Federalist89, 93 (cited in note 61).
63 See Willi Paul Adams, The FirstAmerican Constitutions:Republican
Ideology and
the Making of the State Constitutionsin the Revolutionary Era 91 (North Carolina 1980).
Equally important, Massachusetts was the only state in this period to hold a constitutional
convention. Id at 92.
64 Connecticut and Rhode Island did not write constitutions until 1818 and 1843,
respectively. See Constitution of the State of Rhode Island and ProvidencePlantations:
Introduction (Rhode Island General Assembly), archived at http://perma.cc/93WU-GR3L
(stating that Rhode Island did not adopt a constitution until 1843); Constitution of Connecticut. 1818. (Connecticut General Assembly), archived at http://perma.cc/P8PP-PAQE
(listing 1818 as the date of the adoption of the original Connecticut constitution).
61

62
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Special elections to choose delegates to ratification conventions
were far more democratic-more "populist" in Klarman's
terms-than having existing state legislatures ratify, as the
Articles required.
Having admitted the inadequacies and unpopularity of the
Articles, Klarman argues-as Antifederalists would have-the
Federalists offered the nation a "stark choice" between the new
system and keeping the Articles (p 611). He complains that the
"Federalists triumphed" because "they managed to avoid offering
the American people the option that most of them probably would
have favored: ratification of the Constitution together with
amendments to significantly limit the power of the new national
government and to alter its structure to permit greater populist
influence" (p 617). Antifederalists surely demanded prior amendments or conditional ratification. But these Antifederalists were
defeated, often decisively, in almost every state. If the people
really wanted prior amendments, they would have elected
Antifederalist majorities, but in most states they did not. In the
context of Antifederalist defeats at the polls, it is difficult to understand the basis of Klarman's claim that "most" Americans
wanted prior amendments to eviscerate the power of the new
government.
Neither Klarman nor the Antifederalists ever explained how
prior amendments would have worked. Several state conventions
suggested future amendments. Eventually, Madison would sort
through some two hundred proposed amendments in drafting the
Bill of Rights.65 By eliminating duplications, "[a]bout 100 separate
proposals [could] be distinguished," and a "clear majority" called
for structural changes to undermine the power of the new government.e However, even when the goals of the proposals were duplicative, the details and wording were not. Thus, there would
have been about two hundred prior amendments, many of which
contradicted each other.

65 See Richard Labunski, James Madison and the Struggle for the Bill of Rights 199200 (Oxford 2006) (discussing the various sources Madison used to compile his proposed
amendments). For a broader discussion, see generally Paul Finkelman, James Madison
and the Bill of Rights: A Reluctant Paternity, 1990 S Ct Rev 301.
66 Kenneth R. Bowling, A Tub to the Whale: The Founding Fathersand Adoption of
the Federal Bill of Rights, 8 J Early Republic 223, 228 (1988). See also Paul Finkelman, A
Well Regulated Militia: The Second Amendment in Historical Perspective, 76 Chi Kent L
Rev 195, 200-04 (2000). All the proposals can be found in Helen E. Veit, Kenneth R.
Bowling, and Charlene Bangs Bickford, eds, Creating the Bill of Rights: The Documentary
Record from the FirstFederal Congress 1-54 (Johns Hopkins 1991).
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Klarman argues that the "Antifederalists made a strong case
for conditional ratification" (p 616) but never explains how this
would have worked. Would a new government have been conditionally formed, or would the old Congress under the Articles
have operated, with all its imbecilities, while another convention
considered amendments? Would every ratifying convention have
had to reassemble to approve the amendments? Would the nation
have had to wait until 1790 or 1791 for another convention to deal
with amendments and start the ratification process all over
again?
In reality, conditional ratification was implausible. Each set
of proposed amendments differed in significant ways, and many
were inconsistent with each other. It would have been impossible
for the new government to accept all of them under conditional
ratification. Five states ratified quickly, with no proposed amendments. 67 Would their ratifications have been voided by the subsequent conditional ratifiers? What if these early ratifiers refused
to accept the amendments subsequently proposed by other states?
The nation needed a functional government-not a perpetual debating society. Did the nation have the patience for a multiyear
process of conditional ratifications followed by debates in the old
Congress (or the new Congress?) or in new ratifying conventions
to determine which conditional amendments should be ratified?
Klarman claims that most Americans wanted amendments
"to significantly limit the power of the new national government
and to alter its structure to permit greater populist influence"
(p 617). But the Federalist avalanche in the 1788 elections undermines this claim. Campaigning in support of the existing
Constitution and running against amendments-especially structural amendments-the Federalists swamped their opponents
across the country.68 This suggests that Americans wanted stability, not endless tinkering with the structure of government.
Meanwhile, in every state except Virginia, the state legislatures-which should have been the bastions of populism and
antinational power-sent Federalists to the new Senate.69
After ratification, Madison proposed what became the Bill of
Rights but did not offer amendments to alter the structure of the
See Lloyd, State-by-State Ratification Table (cited in note 41).
See Michael J. Dubin, United States Congressional Elections, 1788-1997 1-3
(McFarland 1998).
69 Senators of the United States: 1789-Present *2 (US Senate), archived
at
http://perma.cc/5Z86-CVM6.
67
68
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Government or sap its energy. He refused to support "a reconsideration of the whole structure of the Constitution-for a reconsideration of the principles and the substance of the powers
given."70 His amendments mostly protected civil liberties and
were "limited to points which are important in the eyes of many
and can be objectionable in those of none," while "the structure
stamina of the Govt. are as little touched as possible."71 Significantly, the states did not ratify the two amendments Madison pro72
posed that went to the structure of the government. This suggests that most Americans were not as keen on structural
changes as Klarman argues.
IV. WHAT THE CONVENTION OF 1787 LOOKED LIKE
How did the Convention accomplish its clear departure from
the existing political structure? Does the Convention of 1787 offer
a model for a modern convention? If we have a modern convention, it will probably not resemble the gathering in Philadelphia.
The nation is desperately short of a James Madison, a James
Wilson, or a Gouverneur Morris, who were thoughtful, politically
experienced, well educated, and steeped in political theory and
the concept of governance. No living American has the credibility
or prominence of Benjamin Franklin or George Washington. We
can find Alexander Hamilton on Broadway, but while Lin-Manuel
Miranda's skills as a composer, lyricist, and actor/singer are superb, I am not sure he can write a new version of The Federalist
Papers. The other delegates were similarly distinguished and famous, heroes of the Revolution, signers of the Declaration of
Independence, diplomats, and scientists. Writing from Paris,
Thomas Jefferson marveled, "It is really an assembly of demigods."73 Sadly, the modern United States is mostly bereft of

demigods.
Beyond personnel, it is unlikely that a modern convention
would operate as our first one did. The 1787 Convention held its

Finkelman, James Madison and the Bill of Rights at 337 (cited in note 65).
Letter from James Madison to Edmund Randolph (June 15, 1789), in Charles F.
Hobson and Robert A. Rutland, eds, 12 The Papersof James Madison 219 (Virginia 1979).
72 These were amendments regulating the size of the House of Representatives and
preventing a sitting Congress from raising its own salary. This eventually became the
Twenty-Seventh Amendment.
73 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Adams (Aug 30, 1787), in Julian P. Boyd,
ed, 12 Papersof Thomas Jefferson 66, 66-69 (Princeton 1955).
70
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meetings in secret and did not record votes of particular delegates. These two rules are essential elements of Professor
Klarman's coup (pp 136-37). They lead to Klarman's complaints
about the lack of "transparency" (pp 249, 616-17) at the
Convention. But transparency was mostly unknown in the eighteenth century. For example, for its first six years the Senate kept
no record of its debates, which were held behind closed doors.74
Convention rules provided "[t]hat nothing spoken in the
House be printed, or otherwise published, or communicated without leave."75 Significantly, there was no public outcry over this

rule. Privately, Jefferson complained of the "abominable [ ] precedent .

.

. of tying up the tongues of their members," which ig-

nored "the value of public discussions."76 But Klarman offers no
other contemporary complaints about the secrecy. After being defeated in their ratifying convention, Pennsylvania Antifederalists
ranted about the "secret conclave" (p 252). Similarly,
Antifederalists in Albany complained that secrecy was the "genius of aristocracy" (p 252). But these are the carpings of the losing side. It seems likely that if the Convention had given
Antifederalists what they wanted, they would not have murmured a word about the closed convention. These Antifederalist
complaints during ratification do not demonstrate public opposition to the closed convention in the summer of 1787.
Klarman argues that secrecy was central to the coup because
it allowed a "relatively like-minded group of elite nationalists" to
"maneuver independent of public opinion" (p 253). Klarman's delegates are hiding in Independence Hall, preventing the people
from hearing the debates, and plotting their coup. However, the
Convention adopted this rule before the debates began and delegates who disagreed vehemently on substantive issues supported
secrecy. Madison claimed that "no Constitution would ever have
been adopted by the convention if the debates had been public,"77
while his nemesis George Mason agreed that secrecy was "a necessary
precaution."78
The complaints
of the Albany
74 See Kenneth R. Bowling and Helen E. Veit, eds, The Diary of William Maclay xixii (Johns Hopkins 1988) (noting the lack of "documentary evidence" of senate debates
"during the six years when it met in secret"); Todd Estes, The Jay Treaty Debate, Public
Opinion, and the Evolution of Early American PoliticalCulture 34 (Massachusetts 2006).
75 Farrand, ed, 1 Records of the Federal Convention at 15 (cited in note 16).
76 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Adams (Aug 30, 1787), in Boyd, 12 The Papers of Thomas Jefferson at 69 (cited in note 73).
77 See Beeman, Plain, Honest Men at 83 (cited in note 3).
78 Farrand, ed, 3 Records of the Federal Convention at 33 (cited in note 8).
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Antifederalists, which Klarman favorably quotes, seem less credible when we know that Robert Yates, the leader of the state's
Antifederalists, supported the secrecy rule at the Convention."9
Tied to the secrecy rule was the decision not to record the
votes of individual delegates because, as Rufus King impressively
argued, "changes of opinion would be frequent in the course of the
business" and such a record would impede deliberations.80 Only
the yeas and nays of each state delegation were recorded. Another
rule allowed any delegate to ask for a reconsideration of any
vote. 81 Similarly, there was no formal record of the debates.
We have a general idea of what happened at the Convention,
mostly because Madison kept fairly detailed notes of the debates
and other delegates kept some notes. But modern scholars have
demonstrated that Madison changed his notes after the
Convention,82 and his note taking was not as superb as we once
thought.83
V. CIVILITY AND CRISIS

What then do the Convention of 1787 and Professor
Klarman's book teach us, as we face the possibility of a new convention? Beyond the difference in structure and rules, the circumstances of 1787 differed dramatically from today in three significant ways. First, America faced a genuine crisis in 1787. The
government was bankrupt, with no coherent and workable foreign or trade policy. Second, it was virtually impossible to amend
the Articles because of the unanimity rule.84 Third was the civility
of debate at the Convention. Despite strong ideological beliefs,
delegates worked together all summer.
This remarkable civility is perhaps the greatest difference between then and now. "As inheritors of a classical republican tradition, the delegates were deeply committed to retaining decorum
79 See Farrand, ed, 1 Records of the Federal Convention at 13-16 (cited in note 16)
(recording no opposition to the rule of secrecy).
80 Id at 10.
81 See id at 16.
82 See Mary Sarah Bilder, Madison's Hand: Revising the Constitutional Convention
179-222 (Harvard 2015).
83

See Beeman, Plain, Honest Men at 98 (cited in note 3).

Amendment of the US Constitution is difficult, and some amendments, such as
eliminating "equality" in the Senate, are structurally impossible. But the other constitutionally absurd provision-the Electoral College-can be practically eliminated when a
sufficient number of states pass legislation to implement the National Popular Vote Compact. See Agreement among the States to Elect the President by NationalPopular Vote (National Popular Vote, Jan 4, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/9VUY-SBU7.
84
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in their proceedings and enforcing a code of gentlemanly respect."8o The Convention provided that any delegate "be called to
order" for disrespectful language and "to explain his conduct or
expressions, supposed to be reprehensible."86 Delegates usually
debated with great civility. As Benjamin Franklin noted, initially
the "debates were carried on with great coolness & temper."87
When debates became more tense, Franklin wisely noted that
"[p]ositiveness and warmth on one side, naturally beget their like
on the other" and "harmony & [u]nion are extremely necessary to
give weight to our Councils, and render them effectual in promoting & securing the common good."88 Given the toxic nature of contemporary politics, it is hard to imagine a modern convention
functioning around notions of "positiveness and warmth" and conducting debates "with great coolness & temper." Despite strong
disagreements, delegates generally displayed remarkable civility
and seriousness of purpose throughout the Convention. But
given their many disagreements and heated debates at the
Convention, they would be surprised-even shocked-by
Klarman's assertion that they were a "relatively like-minded
group of elite nationalists" (p 253).
Some groups were less willing to compromise. Southerners
gained enormous protection for slavery, while small-state populists saddled the nation with the imbecility of state equality in the
Senate, leading, in our own time, to the 204 million people in the
fifteen largest states being represented by thirty US senators,
while the 105 million people in the thirty-five smallest states are
represented by seventy US senators.8 9 The president was (and
still is) elected by that absurdity known as the Electoral College,
which favors small states over large states and allows a minority
of voters-Klarman's populists-to defeat the majority.
Klarman is right that the final Constitution was clearly undemocratic in many ways. But these results are as much a function of the populists as the nationalists. Thus the Senate (along
with the Electoral College) was thoroughly undemocratic and remains so today, but its cause was not the nationalists-the men
Beeman, Plain, Honest Men at 81 (cited in note 3).
Farrand, ed, 1 Records of the Federal Convention at 9 (cited in note 16) (relaying
the May 28 report of Mr. Wythe from the Rules Committee).
87 Id at 197 (summarizing the debate of June 11).
88 Id.
89 See Burnett, CongressionalApportionment at *2 (cited in note 19) (Table 1). For a
more elaborate discussion of this issue, see Finkelman, 58 SLU L J at 1081-82 (cited in
note 19).
85
86
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who ran the coup, according to Klarman (p 247)-but the populists from small states. The nationalists at the Convention wanted
congressional representation based on population. Nothing could
be more democratic than this. But the populists-the antinationalists from the small states-insisted on equality in the Senate
(p 203). Even in the House, representation favors the small
states, making it impossible to achieve anything close to "one person, one vote" for the House. This remains a huge problem, complicated by the absurdity of the decision by Congress more than a
century ago to freeze the size of the House of Representatives. 0
The Convention was hardly a coup. It was the work of diverse
delegates with conflicting agendas and various notions of selfinterest. It might be time to dump the whole system and start
over. That would require another constitutional convention, not
simply a special convention to consider the call for a single
amendment. Are we ready for either kind of convention? Here, the
wisdom of Justice Scalia shines through. "Whoa! Who knows what
would come out of it?"91

90
91

Finkelman, 58 SLU L J at 1081-82 (cited in note 19).
Coyle, Scalia, Ginsburg Offer Amendments to Constitution (cited in note 7).

